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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                        
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Patricia McGuirk Geraci sued her employer, alleging that she 
had been unlawfully terminated because she was pregnant.  The 
district court granted summary judgment to Geraci's employer 
because she had not shown that the employer knew Geraci was 
pregnant when it terminated her.  The district court held that 
given this evidentiary hiatus, Geraci could not make out a prima 
facie case of pregnancy discrimination.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 The facts of this case are set forth in the district court's 
thorough opinion, and we need only summarize.  See Geraci v. 
Moody-Tottrup Int'l, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 241, 243-45 (W.D. Pa. 
1995).  Moody-Tottrup is in the business of inspecting pipe and 
other materials.  It hired Geraci in 1987 as a Clerk Typist but 
consistently promoted her, until she became an Inspection 
Coordinator in 1991.  It appears from the record that Geraci was 
an exemplary employee during her tenure at Moody. 
 In the last week of 1992, Geraci suspected that she was 
pregnant and performed a home pregnancy test; the results were 
positive.  She decided not to inform management at that time, 
however, fearing that she would not receive her annual raise 
scheduled for January or February.  Geraci did tell six of her 
twenty co-workers (none of whom were members of management), but 
specifically asked them not to tell her superiors.  There is no 
evidence that any of them did so, nor that management was 
otherwise informed of Geraci's pregnancy at that time. 
 In late January 1993, management laid Geraci off because of 
a decline in company revenue.  It is undisputed that Moody 
decided to lay Geraci off in mid-December, before Geraci herself 
knew she was pregnant, but that it delayed telling her so as not 
to ruin her holidays. 
 When she was laid off, Geraci asked whether Moody would 
rehire her should business improve.  Moody management advised her 
that she would not be rehired, and that she should look for 
another job.  Geraci then told Moody that she was pregnant. Moody 
continued her health care benefits until after the baby was born 
and gave her three weeks severance pay. 
 A few months later, an advertisement appeared in the local 
newspaper for what appeared to be the same position from which 
Geraci had been terminated.  According to Moody, this position 
arose to fill a large Malaysian contract, but the "Malaysian 
people" wanted an inspection coordinator with "hands-on" 
experience, which Geraci lacked.  In any event, Geraci did not 
apply for this position, believing that it would be futile. Moody 
asserts that because the Malaysian contract did not materialize, 
the position was never filled. 
 In June 1994, after exhausting her administrative remedies, 
Geraci filed this suit in district court, alleging that Moody 
terminated her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(k). After 
discovery, Moody moved for summary judgment, asserting that, 
because there was no evidence that anyone in management knew 
Geraci was pregnant (either when Moody decided to terminate her 
or when it informed her of its decision), Moody could not have 
unlawfully discharged her because of her pregnancy.  The district 
court agreed.  See Geraci, 905 F. Supp. at 245-48. 
II. 
A. 
 Geraci has no direct evidence of unlawful discrimination. 
Instead, she bases her suit on the familiar burden-shifting 
framework first enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973) and 
Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 
101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-95 (1981).  Under that framework, Geraci 
must first make out a prima facie case of unlawful 
discrimination.  Once she has done so, the burden of production 
then shifts to Moody to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for discharging her, at which point the presumption of 
discrimination arising from the prima facie case drops away, 
leaving the burden on Geraci to prove that Moody's proffered 
reasons were pretextual. 
 Here, Moody argues that we need not consider its reasons for 
terminating Geraci or whether they were pretextual, because 
Geraci failed to meet her threshold burden.  We therefore begin 
by determining the elements of the prima facie case of pregnancy 
discrimination, aware that, if Geraci failed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to any of those elements, summary 
judgment was properly granted.  E.g., Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 
F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989). 
B. 
 Were Geraci alleging that Moody terminated her solely 
because she is a woman, she could make out her prima facie case 
by merely showing that she is a member of a protected class, that 
she was qualified for her position, and that she was discharged 
"under conditions that give rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination."  Burdine, 450 U.S at 253, 101 S. Ct. at 1093. 
Although often overlooked, the requirement that the adverse 
employment action occur "under circumstances that give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination" is a critical one that 
weighs heavily in this case. 
 The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework was 
created because only rarely will a plaintiff have direct evidence 
of discrimination.  Gone are the days (if, indeed, they ever 
existed) when an employer would admit to firing an employee 
because she is a woman, over forty years of age, disabled or a 
member of a certain race or religion.  To allow those genuinely 
victimized by discrimination a fair opportunity to prevail, 
courts will presume that, once the plaintiff has shown the above 
elements, unlawful discrimination was the most likely reason for 
the adverse personnel action.  The elements of that prima facie 
case, however, must not be applied woodenly, but must rather be 
tailored flexibly to fit the circumstances of each type of 
illegal discrimination.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 
n.13, 93 S. Ct. at 1824 n.13; Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 
830 (3d Cir. 1994).  
 The traditional McDonnell Douglas-Burdine presumption quite 
properly makes no reference to the employer's knowledge of 
membership in a protected class because, in the vast majority of 
discrimination cases, the plaintiff's membership is either patent 
(race or gender), or is documented on the employee's personnel 
record (age discrimination).  This case, however, is different. 
We cannot presume that an employer most likely practiced unlawful 
discrimination when it does not know that the plaintiff even 
belongs to the protected class.  The employer's knowledge, in 
this class of cases, is a critical element of the plaintiff's 
prima facie case.  Indeed, it is counterintuitive to infer that 
the employer discriminated on the basis of a condition of which 
it is wholly ignorant, and in this situation the bare McDonnell 
Douglas presumption no longer makes sense. 
 In other cases involving personal attributes not obvious to 
the employer, courts have regularly held that the plaintiff 
cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination unless he or 
she proves that the employer knew about the plaintiff's 
particular personal characteristic.  An employee's religion, for 
example, is often unknown to the employer, and we have 
accordingly required employees to inform their employers of their 
religious beliefs in order to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination based on failure to make reasonable 
accommodations.  See Protos v. Volkswagen, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 
133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972, 107 S. Ct. 474 (1986). 
The same rule applies when the plaintiff alleges that she was 
discharged on account of her religion.  See Beasley v. Health 
Care Serv. Corp., 940 F.2d 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 Likewise, disabilities are often unknown to the employer, 
and, because of that, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant employer knew of the disability to state a prima facie 
case of unlawful discharge.  See Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. 
Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1995).  In Hedberg, a case 
filed under the Americans With Disabilities Act, a manager 
claimed he was dismissed because he had a life-threatening 
disease, but the court held that he must show that the employer 
knew of his illness, reasoning that an employer cannot fire 
someone because of a disability it knows nothing about.  Id.; 
accord Morisky v. Broward County, No. 95-4808, 1996 WL 137386, *3 
(11th Cir. Apr. 11, 1996) (per curiam); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. 
Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1993) (Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973). 
 Pregnancy, of course, is different in that its obviousness 
varies, both temporally and as between different affected 
individuals.  It is difficult to imagine that an employer would 
not be aware that an employee is in the later stages of her 
pregnancy; at least if the employer sees the employee.  When the 
pregnancy is apparent, or where plaintiff alleges that she has 
disclosed it to the employer, then a question of the employer's 
knowledge would likely preclude summary judgment.  If the 
pregnancy is not apparent and the employee has not disclosed it 
to her employer, she must allege knowledge and present, as part 
of her prima facie case, evidence from which a rational jury 
could infer that the employer knew that she was pregnant. 
III. 
 The application of this legal framework to the facts of 
Geraci's case need not detain us long.  Geraci was not visibly 
pregnant; indeed, even Geraci herself did not know until shortly 
before she told her coworkers.  She did not tell Moody 
management, and she requested that the six friends and co-workers 
to whom she disclosed her pregnancy not tell management. 
 Geraci argues that because she told six out of twenty co-
workers that she was pregnant and that her pregnancy became a 
"common topic of discussion in the office," management must have 
known it before they terminated her.  But her managers filed 
declarations disclaiming knowledge, and Geraci presented no 
evidence to the contrary.  Geraci deposed only one of those co-
workers whom she told of her pregnancy, and he testified that he 
did not tell management that she was pregnant.  Thus, Geraci 
would have us remand this case for trial on the sheer speculation 
that one or more of the people she entrusted with highly personal 
information violated her confidence and that members of Moody 
management lied about their lack of knowledge.  This is simply 
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.  See 
Hedberg, 47 F.2d at 932 (speculation about employer's knowledge 
of disability does not create a genuine issue of material fact; 
"instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a 
primary goal of summary judgment"). 
 Moody also points to undisputed evidence in the record that 
it decided to lay Geraci off before even she knew she was 
pregnant.  Again, Geraci offers only speculation that Moody must 
have really made its decision to terminate her in January rather 
than in December.  For the reasons already set forth, we must 
reject that speculation. 
 Finally, Geraci relies on Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 
765 (3d Cir. 1994), for the proposition that a "pattern of 
discrimination" and evidence that defendant's asserted non-
discriminatory reason was a pretext, supports an inference that 
defendant knew that she was pregnant.  That contention is 
illogical and unsupported by that case. 
 In Fuentes, we did say that a pattern of discrimination 
could support an inference of pretext, but we did not hold that 
evidence of pretext makes out the plaintiff's prima facie case. 
Indeed, such a holding would make no sense.  Essentially, Geraci 
argues that because Moody had treated women (including pregnant 
women) badly in the past, it must have known that Geraci was 
pregnant, because she was treated badly.  This is flawed 
reasoning which warrants no discussion. 
 All of Geraci's remaining contentions go to the issue of 
pretext and given our conclusion that she has failed to make out 
a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, we need not 
discuss them. 
IV. 
 We find error in neither the district court's reasoning nor 
its conclusion that Geraci failed to state a prima facie case. We 
will therefore affirm its summary judgment. 
                     
298Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
